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Abstract: 
Since Norway passed the first quota mandate for women’s representation on corporate 
boards in 2003, governments have looked to gender quotas as a tool to accelerate gender 
equality.  Though the effects in Norway were at first mixed, as the so-called “golden skirt” 
problem resulted in only a few women occupying multiple board seats, several European 
countries followed Norway’s footsteps and mandated some form of gender quotas on corporate 
boards. 
France passed the quota law of 2011 to increase women representation at the highest 
corporate level in the country’s largest firms. In this article, I examine the early effects of the 
quota. By examining board members of firms that were affected by the law (those in the CAC 40 
Index) and comparing them to the slightly smaller public firms (the CAC Next 20), I find that 
France has thus far avoided its own ‘golden skirt’ situation: the 2011 law has resulted in a 
significant increase in the total number of women who hold corporate board seats. In addition, I 
find that the French law has had a greater impact than may have been anticipated, as firms not 
compelled under the 2011 law to add women to their boards have followed the path of the largest 
French firms and increased representation of women among directors. First, a history of gender 
diversity and quotas in corporate boards is provided. Then, by examining the percentages of 
women in different boards the papers explains the current situation in France. Finally, I point to 
paths for future research by proposing a more thorough analysis of the characteristics of these 
women. 
 
 
Keywords: Gender diversity, corporate board seats, France, women 
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Introduction: 
Women have traditionally been underrepresented in all levels of the corporate ladder. 
Studies show that gender discrimination explains at least some of this underrepresentation. Koch 
et al.1 found that for male-dominated jobs, men were preferred, whereas there was no significant 
discrepancy for female-dominated or gender-integrated jobs. Perhaps to compensate, women feel 
pressure to be omnipresent, always working, sometimes at the expense of their own health and 
family. Surveys conducted by Abt Associates in 2012 found that 25% of mothers surveyed went 
back to work within just two weeks of giving birth, even if it was against medical advice.2 
Although the problem of gender bias is particularly felt in the United States, European countries 
have also struggled with it. In France, employment levels of women are 7% lower than those of 
men, according to a study by the European commission published in 2016.3 Women 
representation is feeble at the highest levels of the corporate ladder, contributing to less 
representation in all other levels. Numerous European countries have taken steps to address this 
issue by imposing quotas, a policy meant to at best, dramatically increase board gender diversity, 
and at the very least, invite companies to reconsider their hiring decisions.  As the IMF also 
                                                     
1 Koch, A. J., D'mello, S. D., & Sackett, P. R. (2015). A meta-analysis of gender stereotypes and 
bias in experimental simulations of employment decision making. Journal of Applied 
Psychology,100(1), 128-161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036734 
 
2 Abt Associates Inc. (2012). Appendix F: Tables of Detailed Results. Managing for World Class 
Safety, 230-262. doi:10.1002/9781118591444.app6 
 
3 Employment statistics. (n.d.). (2016). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Employment_statistics#Employment_rates_by_sex.2C_age_and_educationa
l_attainment 
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noted in 2014, women’s economic participation is a “part of the growth and stability equation”.4 
Women’s representation is feeble at the highest levels of the corporate ladder, which contributes 
to lower representation in all other levels. Numerous European countries have taken steps to 
address this issue by imposing quotas, a policy meant to, at best, dramatically increase board 
gender diversity, and, at the very least, invite companies to reconsider their hiring decisions 
Women’s presence on corporate boards is still at its early stages, as men continue to 
claim most board positions. Sweden, Norway, Spain and France are among the countries that 
have used a hard quota to increase the number of women on corporate boards. France passed a 
law in 2011 requiring companies with more than 500 employees or with a yearly turnover of €50 
million or more to have at least 40% of board seats occupied by women by the end of 2016.5 
While the 40% may at first seem arbitrary, if we consider that boards tend to have 9 or more 
members, the goal is to establish the same number of women or men in a board of that size, so 
that both sides are equally heard.  
It is undeniable that the effect of women on boards must be examined. However, before 
one can delve into their effectiveness and their interactions with their male counterparts in 
driving firm strategy, it is crucial to understand the characteristics of these women. Why were 
they chosen? What attributes do boards seem to be looking for? Do social networks and other 
traditional board selection factors play a role when legislation requires the board to act a certain 
                                                     
4 Elborg-Woytek, K. et al. (n.d.). Women, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from 
Gender Equity. Retrieved March 1, 2017, from Women, Work, and the Economy: 
Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity 
 
5 Werdigier, J. (2011, February 24). In Britain, a Big Push for More Women to Serve on 
Corporate Boards. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/business/global/25board.html 
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way anyway? Do companies respond to legislation by taking concrete measures to increase 
diversity in a way that will impact their firm strategy or are women simply tokens to be added in 
an already well-functioning board? In this paper, I will try to provide answers to some of these 
questions by examining the effect the French quota has had on gender diversity by delving into 
board composition of the largest 60 companies in France. First, a history of gender diversity and 
quotas in corporate boards is provided. Then, by examining the percentages of women in 
different boards the article explains the current situation in France. Finally, I point to paths for 
future research by proposing a more thorough analysis of the characteristics of these women. 
 
A History of Corporate Gender Diversity: 
In 1963, The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan ignited the movement advocating for 
workplace gender equality. Friedan denoted inequality “the problem that has no name” and 
managed to illustrate the frustration of college-educated housewives who were left unfulfilled 
and trapped. Friedan alludes to an internal struggle women often face and have not been able to 
dispel: 
The chains that bind [the suburban housewife] in her trap are chains in her own mind and 
spirit. They are chains made up of mistaken ideas and misinterpreted facts, of incomplete 
truths and unreal choices. They are not easily seen and shaken off.6 
Friedan managed to spark a movement, inviting women to seek fulfillment outside of the house 
and reclaim their right to work. Numerous steps have been taken since then in the right direction, 
starting with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits workplace discrimination 
                                                     
6 Friedan, Betty. 1963. The feminine mystique. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 32.  
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based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.7 The law had a clear impact in female 
employment, with the percentage of employed women increasing steadily from around 32% in 
1964 to 48% in 1992.8 
Though the flow of women into the paid workforce has been fast, a small trickle of 
women have risen to the top of large corporations. In particular, women have been 
underrepresented on corporate boards relative to their share of the workforce, both in the United 
States and internationally. Corporate boards help drive the strategy of firms, and cover issues 
from financial policy to corporate and social responsibility. Gender diversity in positions of 
power has been in the forefront of research for years, yet it is only recently that the debate on 
competence to serve on boards has focused on the selection process and decision-making impact 
of women. While many have pointed to “the glass ceiling” as one of the main reasons women 
cannot rise in top managerial positions, there are other factors at play, such as the ownership 
structure of firms and absence of legislation, that have only recently started to be examined.9 In 
addition to a moral argument for diversity and women’s advancement, research suggests that 
greater gender diversity on corporate boards would enhance their effectiveness. Daehyun and 
Starks argue that women bring unique skills to the table that serve to enhance firm performance. 
                                                     
7 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2017, from 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm 
 
8 Cohen, P. (2012, November 06). Converging Toward Equality: Female Employment From 
1964 to Today. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from 
https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/11/converging-toward-equality-female-
employment-from-1964-to-today/264625/ 
 
9 Nekhili, Mehdi, and Hayette Gatfaoui. 2013. "Are Demographic Attributes and Firm 
Characteristics Drivers of Gender Diversity? Investigating Women’s Positions on French 
Boards of Directors." Journal Of Business Ethics 118, no. 2: 227-249. Business Source 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
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By providing additional expertise, women enhance boards’ advisory effectiveness.10 Team 
composition at the highest level is strongly correlated with innovation11, and thus, gender 
diversity and the unique skills women bring to the table, should be promoted. 
According to Adams and Kirchmaier, women in the STEM and Finance (STEM&F) 
industries feature lower representation of women on corporate boards that in other fields.12 
While it comes as no surprise that corporate boards seats tend to be filled by men in these 
industries, since women are underrepresented in these fields throughout the corporate ladder, it is 
crucial that corporate leadership teams and policy makers consider how to make boards more 
diverse. Moreover, Burgess and Tharenou provide a review of the characteristics of the women 
who have made it into the ‘old boys club’. They examine factors such as the proactive creation of 
networks, self-promotion techniques, training and career development, which can all contribute 
to women attaining board directorship positions; they suggest the need to examine data across 
more countries.13  
                                                     
10 Kim, Daehyun, and Laura T. Starks. 2016. "Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Do 
Women Contribute Unique Skills?†." American Economic Review 106, no. 5: 267-271. 
Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
 
11 Bantel, K. A. et Jackson, S. E. (1989). "Top management and innovations in banking : does 
the composition of the top team make a difference?" Strategic Management Journal, 10, 107-
124.  
 
12 Adams, Renée B., and Tom Kirchmaier. 2016. "Women on Boards in Finance and STEM 
Industries†." American Economic Review 106, no. 5: 277-281. Business Source 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
 
13 Burgess, Z., & Tharenou, P. (2002). "Women board directors: Characteristics of the few. " 
Journal of Business Ethics, 37(1), 39–49. 
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A report published by EY in 2014 alludes to the fact that there are more men named John 
on company boards in the US than there are women.14 In the UK, a name check study performed 
by The Guardian had similar findings; there are more men named John running FTSE100 
companies than there are women.15 
 
History of Women in Corporate Boards: 
 The history of women in corporate boards has been a long one. Norway was the first 
country to pass a law requiring that in boards of more than nine members, 40% of seats are filled 
by women in 2003.16 By mandating gender diversity in the board room, Norway managed to 
increase female representation by 31%, from 11% in 2003, to 42% by 2008.17 Norway is a 
special case, in that the country already had measures promoting gender equality on the 
corporate ladder before the board quota mandate was adopted. Starting with the Norwegian 
Equality Act of 1978, gender quotas have been a common policy in Norway to promote equality 
                                                     
14 EY. (2014). Women on US Boards: what are we seeing? . Retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_Women_on_US_boards:_what_are_we_seeing/$FILE/EY-women-on-us-boards-what-are-we-
seeing.pdf 
 
15 Rankin, J. (2015, March 06). Fewer women leading FTSE firms than men called John. 
Retrieved February 27, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/06/johns-
davids-and-ians-outnumber-female-chief-executives-in-ftse-100 
 
16 Corporate governance and directors' duties in Norway: overview. (n.d.). Retrieved February 
27, 2017, from http://uk.practicallaw.com/6-551-0927?q=#a639402 
 
17 Bøhren, %., & Staubo, S. (2015). Mandatory Gender Balance and Board 
Independence. European Financial Management,22(1), 3-30. doi:10.1111/eufm.12060 
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policies, more so than in other Scandinavian countries.18 In the domain of politics, various 
parties have introduced internal quotas to promote gender equality which has resulted in women 
occupying approximately 38% of the seats in parliament and 44% of cabinet seats between 2005-
2009.19 Nevertheless, although Norway has had a history of advocating for gender equality in all 
aspects of society, a study done by Grønmo and Løyning in 2003, found that only 14.3% of 
directors in Norwegian banks and the 200 largest companies in the year 2000 were women.20 In 
2003, the Norwegian Government mandated that boards of directors of all companies bound by 
law should be gender balanced. After dialogues between the government and the private sector, 
however, the government agreed to withdraw the amendment if companies complied voluntarily 
by July 2005. Neverthless, a study by the Norwegian Government in 2008 revealed that the 
proportion of women was not near being equal to that of men – it had only risen to 16%. 
Therefore, to promote utility and justice, the Norwegian government passed a quota law 
requiring all state-owned, municipality-owned and cooperative companies attain a 40% women 
board representation within two years.21 State intervention managed to increase women’s 
representation but ‘golden skirts’ suggest its impact was limited. The ‘golden skirts’ effect as it 
                                                     
18 Skjeie, H., & Teigen, M. (2005). Political constructions of gender equality: Travelling towards 
a gender balanced society? NORA Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 13(3), 
187—197. 
 
19 Seierstad, C., & Opsahl, T. (2011). For the few not the many? The effects of affirmative action 
on presence, prominence, and social capital of women directors in Norway. Scandinavian 
Journal of Management,27(1), 46  
 
20 Grønmo, S., & Løyning, T. (2003). Sosiale nettverk og økonomisk makt. Bergen, Norway: 
Fagbokforlaget. 
 
21 The Norwegian Government (2008). Representation of both sexes on company boards. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/Topics/Equality/rules-on-gender-representation-on-
compan.html 
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was called in Norway, meant that women were appointed to multiple boards and, thus, the pool 
of women rising to the top did not expand significantly. As a result, the law has been less 
effective, at least in the short-term, of expanding the pipeline for women to get to the top, since 
the pool of choice for most large companies remained very narrow. Moreover, a fewer number of 
women spread thin on multiple boards suggests they would not have the time or influence to 
serve as strong voices and mentor up-and-coming women managers or potential board members.  
 Norway was the first country to implement gender quotas for board composition, and set 
the example for more European governments to follow in its footsteps. An examination of the 
impact of quotas in Italy showed more promising results. While Italy is generally thought to be a 
more conservative country, where men thrive in the corporate world while women’s careers are 
often left behind, research results showed that the introduction of a quota helped not only 
increase gender diversity on Italian corporate boards, but also resulted in enhanced education 
levels of directors, and had a positive effect on the stock market. Companies in Italy realized that 
in order to achieve greater representation of women they had to change their board selection 
mechanisms, which further helped companies. The factors that usually prohibit women from 
entering a board, such as stereotypes, limited access to networks, and missing leadership or 
mentorship were overcome in the Italian case.22 Italy’s example illustrates that it is possible to 
achieve an increase of the diversity in the board pool, and perhaps other countries have also 
succeeded. 
                                                     
22 Ferrari, G., Ferraro, V., Profeta, P., & Pronzato, C. (2016, December 12). Gender quotas beat 
Italy's "male gerontocracy". Retrieved March 1, 2017, from 
http://www.niussp.org/article/gender-quotas-beat-italys-male-gerontocracyles-quotas-de-genre-
ebranlent-la-gerontocratie-masculine-en-italie/?print=pdf 
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The type of quota various European countries have passed varies, from quotas with 
sanctions, without sanctions, to voluntary targets.23 France, Italy, and Belgium have all 
implemented quotas with sanctions.24 The quota mandated by France in 2011 required a 
minimum of 20% of corporate board seats to be filled by each gender by 2014, with the 
percentage rising to 40% by 2017.25 A law passed in Italy required 33% of each gender on 
boards of public and state-owned companies by 2015, while also instituting a progressive 
warning system in the event of non-compliance that would eventually lead to the dissolution of 
the board.26 Belgium passed a similar quota requiring 33% representation by each gender, with 
firms threatened by fines for failure to comply.27  
 Gender quotas without sanctions have been implemented in Spain, Iceland, Germany, and 
the Netherlands.28 In 2007, Spain encouraged large publicly traded companies to enact a 40% 
                                                     
23 European Commission. 2012. Women in economic decision-making in the EU: Progress report. 
Luxembourg: European 
Union, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf 
 
24 Sweigart, A. (2012). Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of Boardroom Quotas 
As a Tool For Progress in the United States and Canada, Northwestern Journal of International 
Law & Business, 32(4), 81-105. Retrieved March 1, 2017.  
 
25 Law 2011-103 (January 27, 2011) entitled “On the equal representation of men and women on 
boards of directors and supervisory boards and professional equality.” 
 
26 Zampano, G. (2012, June 5). Italy to push pink quotas. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 
1, 2017, from 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303395604577431832161133916 
 
27 Teigen, M. (2012). Gender quotas on corporate boards: On the diffusion of a distinct national 
policy reform. In Firms, boards and gender quotas: Comparative perspectives, 29, 115-146. 
Emerald Group, http://www.gig.gu.se/digitalAssets/1443/1443377_csr-2012m_teigen1.pdf 
 
28 B. (2014, August 11). Legislative Board Diversity. Retrieved March 01, 2017, from 
http://www.catalyst.org/legislative-board-diversity#footnote1_k692yzn 
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board composition by 2015.29 Iceland followed in 2010, also requiring a 40% representation in 
all publicly listed companies as well as companies with more than 50 employees by 2013.30 The 
Netherlands was next, requiring public and private firms with more than 250 employees have at 
least 30% of each gender on their executive and supervisory boards, while also instituting a 
“comply or explain” mechanism for firms who fail to do so.31 Germany was the most recent 
country, in 2015, to enact a board diversity law: that at least 30% of new German board seats 
must be reserved for women in 2016, increasing the ratio to 50% by 2018.32  
 The United Kingdom has adopted the policy of voluntary targets for corporate boards, 
stressing in a 2011 Lord Davies report that FTSE 100 companies should have strived for a 25% 
female representation by 2015.33  
 
France as a Focal Point: 
This study focuses on boards in France, a country usually applauded for its women-
friendly workplace policies. We chose France as my country of study not only because I am 
                                                     
29 Giovinco, A. (2014). Gender Diversity In The Boardroom. Context And Spanish 
Case. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition,10(3).  
 
30 Id 25.  
 
31 Velte, P., & Stiglbauer, M. (2013). The Economic Versus Moral Perspective of Board 
Diversity. The International Journal of Organizational Diversity,12(2), 71-77.  
 
32 Zeldin, W. (2015, March 17). Global Legal Monitor. Retrieved March 01, 2017, from 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-gender-quotas-for-large-companies-and-
for-federal-bodies/ 
 
33 (Women on Boards Report) - Gov.uk. (2011, February). Retrieved March 1, 2017, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-745-
women-on-boards.pdf2fuploads%2fattachment_data%2ffile%2f31480%2f11-745-women-on-
boards.pdf&p=DevEx,5062.1 
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studying abroad there, which gives me easier access to data, but also because of the law adopted 
that by the end of 2016, 40% of board seats of the largest listed and non-listed companies should 
be women.34 This law affects the companies that belong to the CAC 40 Index, which denotes the 
40 most capitalized companies in the country. Companies include AXA, Total, LVMH, and 
Kerring to name a few. Many feminist activists and scholars view this quota legislation as a step 
in the right direction, with the French government realizing the issue women face (commonly 
referred to as “plafond de verre”) and trying to accelerate diversity via mandates for gender 
diversity on corporate boards. The French law also opens the door for other types of diversity 
(religious, racial, etc.) to be implemented in the country in later years. Nekhili and Gatfaoui 
argue that various factors, such as the ownership structure, the existing corporate governance 
characteristics, and the demographic attributes of female directors influence the number of board 
seats occupied by women. In particular, they find that family ownership is an important factor, 
and tends to lead to more women directorships, while institutional ownership is not significantly 
correlated with the appointment of women directors. They do, however, find that managers with 
significant ownership stakes “support women with higher levels of education and a business 
background”.35  While France is one of the countries with the highest women board 
representation; according to Terjesen et al. 22% of board directors are women, the institutional 
                                                     
34 Nekhili, Mehdi, and Hayette Gatfaoui. 2013. "Are Demographic Attributes and Firm 
Characteristics Drivers of Gender Diversity? Investigating Women’s Positions on French 
Boards of Directors." Journal Of Business Ethics 118, no. 2: 227-249. Business Source 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
 
35 Nekhili, Mehdi, and Hayette Gatfaoui. 2013. "Are Demographic Attributes and Firm 
Characteristics Drivers of Gender Diversity? Investigating Women’s Positions on French 
Boards of Directors." Journal Of Business Ethics 118, no. 2: 227-249. Business Source 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
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context is only now being shaped and the laws only now enforced for them to rise to the top36. It 
remains to be seen whether this legislation will have an impact on corporate effectiveness and 
firm risk by further studies. Has the quota requirement been embraced by existing boards 
because they understand its merits, or has it just become another ‘requirement’ they have to 
fulfill? One wonders whether firms will start mentoring and developing women to occupy board 
seats or look to hire from outside, as they have done traditionally.  
In this paper, I will explore French legislature and how it has impacted the representation 
of women in boards. Whether as ‘business experts’ or ‘support specialists’, women have not 
been as well represented in French boards, even though they often exhibit a higher educational 
level than their male counterparts.37 Have French companies have been proactive in their board 
selection process?  Norway managed to increase the number of women present, and while the 
Norwegian story is not always mentioned as an example of success in expanding the applicant 
pool, it is crucial to note that Norway set the path for other European countries.  
In an interview with Siri Terjesen, one of the prominent figures in the field of gender 
research in Norway, the success of the quota lies in its ability to shape the composition of the 
corporate ladder. Having women in the board room is an effective way to counteract the culture 
of bias that still permeates the corporate world and ensure that not only are more women 
                                                     
36 Terjesen, Siri, Ruth Aguilera, and Ruth Lorenz. 2015. "Legislating a Woman's Seat on the 
Board: Institutional Factors Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors." Journal Of 
Business Ethics 128, no. 2: 233-251. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 
September 18, 2016). 
 
37 Oé, Mamadout. 2014. "Les déterminants individuels du plafond de verre : cas de la 
composition des instances de gouvernance des entreprises françaises cotées." 
Management International / International Management / Gestión Internacional 18, no. 4: 
48-67. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
 
  
 15 
represented throughout the ladder, but also that board effectiveness is improved.38 It is with this 
in mind that we set out to explore gender diversity in corporate boards in France.  
 
Research Question:  
Our research is two-fold; first, we want to explore whether France has fallen into the 
same trap as Norway. Per Seierstad and Opsahl data39, the number of directorships held by 
individual women in Norway increased dramatically from 2003 to 2009. In 2002, one woman 
was considered a prominent director if she was on four boards, whereas in 2009 the number had 
increased to eight. We want to explore whether the same has happened in France; are different 
companies picking the same few already acclaimed women and adding them to their boards? Our 
hypothesis is that women representation on boards has increased, but the number of different 
women in boards has not, or, at least, increased at a substantially lower rate. Based on the 
experience of Norway, we hypothesize that the pool of women directors has not expanded as 
much as a proponents of the quota law might have expected. 
I plan to explore the composition of boards in various industries in France with the hope 
of understanding some of the factors that influence gender diversity. Multiple European 
countries have instituted legislature that aims to increase the presence of women in corporate 
boards, as gender diversity has a significant impact on firm profitability and strategic decision 
                                                     
38 IStockphoto, (n.d.). The secret behind Norway's gender quota success. Retrieved March 1, 
2017, from http://kjonnsforskning.no/en/2016/10/secret-behind-norways-gender-quota-success 
 
39 Seierstad, C., & Opsahl, T. (2011). For the few not the many? The effects of affirmative action 
on presence, prominence, and social capital of women directors in Norway. Scandinavian 
Journal of Management,27(1), 44-54  
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making.40 My overarching goal is to study the characteristics of the women that managed to 
break the barriers and the ‘plafond de verre’ and gain entrance into the ‘old boys’ club’.  
In addition, we hypothesize that companies only add women directors under compulsion. 
To test this hypothesis, we compare companies ranked 31-40 on the CAC 40 to the next 10 
companies (ranked 41-50), which have not yet been impacted by the legislation. Our expectation 
is that the law is carrying all the weight and in the 41-50 companies we see limited or no change 
in the number of women in the board from after the law came into effect until today. In that way, 
I believe I can have a meaningful contribution to the research community, since I will be 
expanding on the Burgess & Tharenou paper41 by examining their suggestions in the context of a 
new country, France.  
Before conducting my research, I need to search for similar studies in other countries that 
passed legislation before France, such as Norway and Sweden. In Norway women tend to be 
appointed to more senior management positions than in other countries before being appointed to 
a board42, and I would like to investigate whether the same is true in France. Is this a factor that 
was considered when picking women for French boards? Are there others that seem more 
important? The ‘golden skirts’ effect as it was called in Norway, meant that women were 
                                                     
40 Kim, D., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Do Women 
Contribute Unique Skills? American Economic Review,106(5), 267-271. Business Source 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
 
 
41 Id 10. 
 
42 Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of Boardroom Quotas As a 
Tool For Progress in the United States and Canada, 32 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 81A (2012).  
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appointed to multiple boards and, thus, the pool of women rising to the top did not expand 
significantly.  
Regarding the second part of my project, I am assuming that the law is carrying all the 
weight and the companies that are not in the CAC 40, and thus not impacted by legislation, have 
not taken steps to increase gender diversity in their boards. It would be surprising if we found 
that companies 41-50 of the top 100 by market capitalization have changed their board 
composition to remain competitive and in anticipation of new legislation.  
 
Data Collection  
 
 
We model our methodology after Nekhili & Gatfaoui’s43 paper, which examined the 
drivers of gender diversity on boards before the results of the reform were accounted for. I 
categorized companies by market capitalization and conducted my analysis on the companies 
comprising the CAC 40 Index. This is a capitalization weighted index which includes the 40 
most liquid French stocks traded on the Paris stock exchange. My analysis is not as extensive as 
Nekhili and Gatfaoui’s, and hence I only focus on collecting the annual reports of the companies 
to record the number of women directors in each. After obtaining a list of all the women that 
occupy board seats, I assess how many women are in each of the boards of CAC 40 companies 
and record the percentages of women occupying board seats. I am then able to judge whether 
companies have been successful in following the reforms or if punitive measures will follow. In 
examining the data, we can test our first hypothesis, whether the pool of women directors has not 
                                                     
43 Nekhili, Mehdi, and Hayette Gatfaoui. 2013. "Are Demographic Attributes and Firm 
Characteristics Drivers of Gender Diversity? Investigating Women’s Positions on French Boards 
of Directors." Journal Of Business Ethics 118, no. 2: 227-249. Business Source Complete, 
EBSCOhost (accessed September 18, 2016). 
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expanded significantly. Moreover, it has enabled us to model the analysis of the CAC 40 to 
include the CAC Next 20, and thus check whether companies 41-50 of the French market 
capitalization index have changed their board composition to include more women in 
anticipation of the law.  
 
Findings: 
France has managed to avoid Norway's golden skirt problem. Although some of the 
women who have been chosen for CAC Next 20 boards that are also in a CAC 40 board, there 
doesn't seem to be such a huge discrepancy as was the case in Norway. The most board positions 
any one woman has is 4. It is interesting to note that Clara Gaymard, the only woman who 
occupies four board positions in France, is the ex-head of General Electric in France, and was 
asked to join the boards of LVMH, Danone, Bouygues and Veolia Environnement. The 
percentages of women in corporate boards is illustrated in the following table: 
 
 
 
 
CAC 40 Number % 
Total Number of Women on Board of Directors 209 100 
Total Number of Women in 2 Boards in CAC 40 17 8.1 
Total Number of Women in 3 Boards in CAC 40 3 1.4 
Total Number of Women in 4 Boards in CAC 40 1 0.5 
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After analyzing all the CAC 40 companies44, we observe that the ratio of women 
represented in multiple boards is not as significant as was in the case of Norway. Overall, French 
companies seem to have avoided the problem of ‘the golden skirts’ encountered by Norway. 8% 
of women are members of two corporate boards, while the number drops to just over 1% for 
three boards.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that France learned from Norway’s mistakes, with 
companies being more cautious when choosing who to appoint to their boards. Another possible 
reason, much more practical in nature, is that the French quota law only applied to a very 
specific set of companies, ranging a variety of industries, and thus there could not be a 
significant number of common candidates among them. The pool of women on boards seems to 
be quite diverse, since we do not observe the extremes seen in Norway where a woman could 
hold as many as 8 board positions.  
Regarding the second question we are asking, that is whether the CAC Next 2045 have 
altered their board composition in anticipation of legislation, I determined the percentages for the 
companies that have more than 40% women for the branches 41-50 and 51-60 of the group and 
the range for the ones that do not yet have more than 40% women. We note two interesting 
findings. First, regarding our original question of whether the CAC Next 20 companies have 
adhered to the quota in anticipation of a law applying to them, too, we observe that they have. 
50% of companies in the 41-50 group have more than 40% women, while the rest are between 20 
and 36%. In the next 20 companies, 40% have boards that are consistent with the quota mandate, 
                                                     
44 CAC 40 | Euronext. (n.d.). Retrieved December 27, 2016, from 
https://www.euronext.com/en/products/indices/FR0003500008-XPAR/market-information 
 
45 CAC NEXT 20 | Euronext. (n.d.). Retrieved December 27, 2016, from 
https://www.euronext.com/en/products/indices/QS0010989109-XPAR/market-information 
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while the rest are at 20-39%. Our null, that the law would be carrying all the weight and 
companies would not try to employ as many women if not already compelled by a law, can thus 
be rejected. The law affecting the companies comprising the CAC 40 definitely had an impact in 
the board composition of the CAC Next 20, as can be seen in the following table. Data was 
collected from the annual reports of CAC Next 20 companies in order to observe the progression 
of women seats on the board. We observe that the percentage of women in boards jumped from 
2009 (when the law had not been implemented yet) to 2010 (when the law was passed) for most 
companies. We recognize that this is a small data set, and as such it is hard to draw conclusions, 
but the progression of the number of women on boards gives us an indication. Some companies 
went from a non-existent or minimal number of women to more than 40% women directors in 
2016. The increase in the number of women is too high to be a mere coincidence, and rather 
alludes to a secular trend because of legislation.  
CAC next 20 - % of Women on Board Evolution 
 2016 2010 2009 
ALSTOM 36.4 3.0 1.0 
ARKEMA 45.5 18.2 11.1 
ATOS 43.8 16.7 8.3 
BUREAU VERITAS 45.5 0.0 0.0 
CASINO GUICHARD 40.0 13.3 13.3 
DASSAULT SYSTEMES 36.4 0.0 0.0 
EDF 45.5 0.0 0.0 
EIFFAGE 30.0 20.0 20.0 
GEMALTO 29.4 0.0 0.0 
GROUP EUROTUNNEL 45.5 18.2 9.1 
HERMES INTL 42.1 22.2 22.2 
ILIAD 38.5 - - 
INGENICO GROUP 37.5 - 1.0 
NATIXIS 45.5 12.5 6.7 
SCOR SE 41.7 6.3 0.0 
SES 33.3 5.9 5.9 
STMICROELECTRONICS 33.3 0.0 0.0 
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SUEZ 20.0 1.0 1.0 
THALES 45.5 6.3 0.0 
ZODIAC AEROSPACE 30.0 27.3 10.0 
 
Moreover, by conducting an analysis similar to the one for CAC 40 companies, we 
observe the overlap in women sitting on different boards. Here, the overlap is very little, with 
only 2.1% of women in two boards in the CAC Next 20 and only 1.1% of women in 3 boards, as 
can be seen from the following table. 
CAC Next 20   
Total Number of Women on Board of Directors 94 100 
Total Number of Women in 2 Boards in CAC Next 20 2 2.1 
Total Number of Women in 3 Boards in CAC Next 20 1 1.1 
 
 Expanding our analysis, we observe the overlap between CAC 40 and CAC Next 20. 
Almost 10% of women are in two boards across the 60 companies, while only 2.3% are in 3 
boards.  France certainly did not behave like Norway; while a few women have been placed in 2 
or more boards, companies have expanded the pool of candidates for directorships, thus truly 
increasing gender diversity in the board room. Another, also interesting finding is that out of 303 
boards seats in the 60 companies, women make up 100. 33% of board seats across companies in 
those two indices are occupied by women, illustrating a step in the right direction, as well as the 
fact that French companies have tried to be proactive and increase their board diversity. Perhaps 
the fact that France is a larger and more diverse economy than Norway’s provides some 
explanation, since the pool of women considered for board seats is not as narrow.  
 
CAC 40 & CAC Next 20 Combined   
Total Number of Women on Board of Directors 303 100 
  
 22 
Total Number of Women in 2 Boards in CAC 40 & CAC Next 20 Combined 29 9.6 
Total Number of Women in 3 Boards in CAC 40 & CAC Next 20 Combined 7 2.3 
 
Recommendations for Future Research: 
 In Norway, the phenomenon of ‘Golden Skirts’ meant that the original goal by the 
government to expand the pool of applicants was not successful. Does that mean, however, that 
there have not been any lessons learned? Perhaps a similar study could be carried out in France 
to examine the effect of quotas on boards selection mechanisms, as well as company 
performance measures. Burgess and Tharenou’s emblematic paper in this field provides a great 
starting point for anyone wishing to explore this issue.46 The characteristics of the women who 
make it to French boards need to be examined to more comprehensively understand board 
selection processes and the impact of legislation. Overall education levels, access to mentoring 
opportunities, and network ties are a few of the factors with impactd on board selection 
mechanisms that would be worth analyzing. On the financial performance side,the impact of 
gender diversity mandates on risk-aversion and stock-market performance merits further study.  
 Another possibility would be to explore what the impact of French culture is on the board 
selection process and whether that has changed voluntarily after the quota was mandated. France 
is a country that has long promoted gender equality via labor law and social policy. For example, 
France was one of the first countries to allow both men and women to receive their full-time 
salary while they are on maternity leave, as well as the famous ‘allocations familiales’, stipends 
after the maternity leave period has passed, to ensure that the family does not suffer.47 It would 
                                                     
46 Id 10. 
 
47 France vs U.S. -- Paid Maternity and Paternity Leave. (2016, March 24). Retrieved March 1, 
2017, from http://peacockplume.fr/opinions/france/france-vs-us-paid-maternity-and-paternity-
leave 
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be interesting to see whether, in following years, more laws will come to pass not only aimed at 
retroactively improving gender diversity but also crystallizing the conditions necessary for 
women to more easily gain entrance into boards.  
 
Conclusion: 
In sum, France seems to have avoided the problems encountered by Norway. Gender 
equality in the board room has been a topic researchers have strived to explore, especially after 
Norway. While women certainly contribute unique skills and their presence helps companies in 
multiple ways, European countries are only now starting to catch up and proactively require a 
certain number of women in each company’s boards. In France, the problem of ‘Golden Skirts’ 
has been avoided, perhaps simply owing to the small number of companies and little overlap in 
industries among them.  
Regarding companies in the CAC 40, the overlap in corporate board seats is not 
significant, signifying an expansion of the gender pool, as the law had intended. Companies 
composing the CAC Next 20 have attained a board composition comparable to that of the CAC 
40, despite not yet being affected by a law. Our findings suggest that France has been more 
successful than Norway was at the beginning of its quota trajectory, as well as the fact that 
French companies are proactively looking to increase women representation on their boards, 
even without a law in place. The CAC Next 20 already have a large percentage of women on 
their boards, and we can hope that other companies will follow in their footsteps. This paper acts 
as a preliminary analysis of the situation in France, but further examination is required to 
understand the role women play on corporate boards post-legislation and whether its impact on 
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board dynamics and firm performance has been positive as was the case in other countries.  
Studies that examine the impact of gender-diverse boards on firm productivity and gender-
equality in the workplace should be carried out. Indicators such as risk avoidance and mentorship 
programs can help us understand whether having more women in the board room has actually 
improved the company’s financial position and has had an effect on its human capital.  
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